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Absract: The relationship between the physical body and the conscious human mind has 
been a deeply problematic topic for centuries.  Physicalism is the 'orthodox' metaphysical 
stance in contemporary Western thought, according to which reality is exclusively 
physical/material in nature. However, in the West, theoretical dissatisfaction with this type of 
approach has historically lead to Cartesian-style dualism, wherein mind and body are thought 
to belong to distinct metaphysical realms. In the current discussion I compare and contrast 
this standard Western approach with an alternative form of dualism developed in the 
Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophical tradition, where matter and pure consciousness are held to 
belong to distinct and independent realms, but where the mind is placed on the material side 
of the ontological divide. I argue that this model possesses a number of theoretical 
advantages over Cartesian-style dualism, and constitutes a compelling theoretical framework 
for re-conceptualizing the mind-body problem.  
 
1. The Mind-Body Problem 
When Western scientific investigation began uncovering the physical mechanisms underlying 
conscious sensory experience, a deep conceptual problem immediately came to the fore. 
Experimental analysis revealed a systematic correlation between, for example, the frequency 
of sound waves propagated through the atmosphere and our perception of high versus low 
musical notes. And the different frequencies of visible light were systematically correlated 
with our perception of different colors. Furthermore, anatomical research revealed various 
physiological aspects of our sensory organs that encode these salient features of the 
environmental stimulus and transmit them though the central nervous system.  There was 
clearly a fundamental association between the environmental stimulus and anatomy of our 
sensory mechanisms, on the one hand, and our subjective conscious experience, on the other. 
Yet it seemed entirely mysterious how the one could be equated with or even give rise to the 
other. How could the sentient, first person, qualitative realm of experience stem from or be 
identical to physiological activities occurring in the sense organs and brain?  The basic nature 
and characteristics of the two types of phenomena appear to be totally disjoint when viewed 
in their own terms. This seemingly fundamental disparity remains one of the main challenges 
to a purely physicalist worldview.   
 
Cartesian-style dualistic ontologies constitute a standard alternative model. According to the 
version put forth by Leibniz, the two realms are postulated to be separate and independent, 
but to progress through time in parallel according to a 'pre-established harmony'. This 
theoretical picture accommodates both the detected correlation between phenomenological 
and physical events, as well as the basic intuition that the two realms are nonetheless distinct. 
Hence when I have the conscious desire to raise my right arm, this event in the mental realm 
is mirrored by a corresponding event in the physical world and my right arm goes up. So the 
correlation, although real, is purely contingent, and there is no direct causal link between the 
two types of substance. As another case in point, Locke (1668) held that the ‘simple ideas’ or 
conscious presentations that we experience in apparent response to impingements from the 
external world, bear no intelligible relation to the ‘corpuscular processes’ underlying such 
impingement and bodily response. Instead, the two phenomena are simply stuck together (by 
God) in a more or less arbitrary manner.  
 
The human body, replete with sense organs, central nervous system and brain, is a normal 
subsystem of the physical universe, and as such should be fully explained and governed by 
the standard laws of nature. These laws only advert to what Locke called 'primary qualities', 
and in principle the time-evolution of the entire physical universe can be accounted for in 
terms of such qualities. Physical science in general, including molecular biology and neuro-
anatomy in particular, does not invoke any 'secondary qualities', such as the delicate scent of 
a rose or the deep cobalt hue of a desert sky. Instead, all of the scientifically accessible and 
mechanistically sufficient properties of my brain consist of primary qualities, and in theory at 
least, one could obtain an exact physical duplicate of my brain if one were to exhaustively 
replicate its objective primary qualities.  Hence it seems consistent with all the facts 
specifiable in terms of physics, molecular biology, etc., that my brain churns along according 
to normal electrochemical and anatomical processes and yet is utterly devoid of conscious 
presentation. Indeed, it doesn't appear to contradict any aspect of fundamental science to hold 
that only primary qualities exist, which indicates that at our present level of understanding, 
scientific theory alone cannot answer the question of why this is not a zombie universe, 




 century, with the work of Helmholtz and others, significant progress had been 
made investigating the physiological mechanisms involved in sensation. But the ultimate 
nature of the relation between these mechanisms and the associated conscious experience was 
still no clearer than in Descartes' day. As above, (non-interactive) dualism asserts that there is 
no causal connection between mental and physical events. On the generally granted 
assumption that the universe is a causally closed system, there is no theoretical need to 
invoke additional factors to predict and explain all properly physical phenomena, including 
human bodily movements and the underlying neurological activities that initiate and control 
them.  As a proper subset of the physical universe, the upward motion of my right arm can be 
fully accounted for without appeal to subjective mental factors. 
 
And as with the motions of my limbs, so too with verbal behavior, including reports on my 
own conscious experiences. Hence when I state that there is a sharp pain in my toe, this 
episode of verbal performance can in principle be fully accounted for through appeal to 
purely objective physical events in my toe and central nervous system, eventually leading to 
movements in my larynx, tongue and mouth resulting in the production of various sonic 
emissions. The subjective, qualitative feeling of the pain itself, the intense secondary quality 
with which I have direct first person acquaintance, would seem to have no causal role to play. 
The sufficiency of objective, third person factors led to Huxley's view that conscious 
experience must be a mere 'epiphenomenon'. Epiphenomenalism acknowledges the 
seemingly superfluous causal status of conscious experience in the objective, third person 
scientific account of brain mechanics and physical behaviour. This theme will be briefly 
revisited in the final section of the paper. 
 Huxley eloquently depicts the conceptual problem as to the nature of the relation between 
conscious experience and physical mechanisms in the passage: "How it is that anything so 
remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is 
just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djinn when Aladdin rubbed his lamp" 
(Huxley, 1886 p. 170). Following terminology later introduced by Chalmers (1996), the 
seemingly brute unaccountability that Huxley portrays is now widely known as the 'Hard 
Problem' of consciousness. As above, the nature of the relation between mind and body 
induces an entire family of related issues, including the status of mental causation and the 
place of consciousness in the natural world.  
 
2. Cartesian versus Sāṃkhya-Yoga Dualism 
Cartesian mind-body dualism arose within the foregoing context of scientific advancement 
and discovery, combined with the older Western philosophical and cultural heritage 
stemming from Judeo-Christian and Hellenistic sources. Not withstanding the abundant 
criticism the text has received over the centuries, Descartes' Meditations, in some sense still 
provides the most definitive, influential and well articulated expression of the presuppositions 
underlying the modern Western conception of mind. Descartes unhesitatingly identifies the 
referent of the indexical expression 'I' with res cogitans, the thinking substance, and thereby 
conceives the mind and self as one. For Descartes, thinking substance is of course 
metaphysically independent of extended substance, which engenders his familiar dualism 
between mind and matter. Also without hesitation, Descartes takes conscious thought and 
subjective experience to be unqualified constituents of mental substance, and this particular 
mode of classification has become so much a part of Western conceptual heritage that the 
dividing line he draws seems almost self-evident. Surely, if a dualism with matter is to be 
entertained, then thoughts and subjective presentations belong on the nonmaterial side of the 
divide? 
 
In contrast to this fairly ubiquitous Cartesian view, the paper will now explore an alternative 
version of substance dualism advanced by two allied schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy, 
namely the Sāṃkhya school, and classical Yoga as expounded by Patañjali. These schools 
draw a metaphysical dividing line not between mind and matter, but rather between matter 
and pure consciousness, wherein the mind is detached from consciousness and placed on the 
material side of the ontological divide. I think that this alternative metaphysical division 
constitutes a fascinating and valuable intellectual perspective for contemporary Western 
thought, and can cast a new light on current discussion concerning the relationship between 
consciousness, mind and body. Indeed, this Indian metaphysical framework provides a 
perspective from which to fundamentally re-conceptualize the mind-body problem.   
 
2.1.  The Sāṃkhya-Yoga View 
The  Sāṃkhya school is one of the oldest philosophical traditions of India, and many of its 
ideas are traceable to the Ṛgveda and the early Upaniṣads. Sāṃkhya has a great many 
theoretical points in common with the later Yoga darśana as expounded in Patañjali's 
Yogasūtra, and the metaphysical position discussed in the present paper is part of their shared 
philosophical framework. Thus the basic dualism between consciousness and matter, as well 
as more specific allied points, will henceforth be referred to, somewhat generically, as the 
'Sāṃkhya-Yoga view.'1 
 
According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view, the ultimate principle underlying matter is prakṛti, the 
metaphysical substrate supporting all material phenomena.
2
 The mind is deemed to be part of 
the material world, and hence to be metaphysically grounded in prakṛti. The body is also part 
of the realm of prakṛti, and thus mind and body are held to be of the same metaphysical 
substance. In its most general connotation, the term 'mind' in western philosophy corresponds 
to the combination or complex of three faculties recognized in the Sāṃkhya taxonomy, 
namely manas, buddhi, and ahamkāra, whose respective significance will be briefly outlined 
below. 
 
Manas (which is often translated directly as 'mind', though it is only a single facet of the 
'mental triplex') is viewed essentially as an organ, the special organ of cognition, just as the 
eyes are the special organs of sight. Indeed, manas is held to be intimately connected with 
perception, since the raw data supplied by the senses must be ordered and categorized with 
respect to a conceptual scheme before various objects can be perceived as members of 
their respective categories, and as inhabiting a world characterized by the systematic and 
distinguishable attributes normally perceived. This imposition of conceptual structure on the 
chaotic field of raw sensation is one of the basal activities of manas, and forms the distinction 
between brute sensation (nirvikalpaka) as opposed to differentiated perception (savikalpaka). 
Hence ordinary perceptual experience is already heavily conditioned by the activities of 
manas, and manas is thus sometimes referred to as the sixth organ of sensation. 
 
In addition to its perceptual activities, manas is held to be responsible for the cognitive 
functions of analysis, deliberation and decision. It is closely allied to buddhi, which is 
somewhat roughly translated as the faculty of 'intellect' or 'reason.' Buddhi is a subtler and 
more powerful faculty than manas, and is responsible for the higher level intellectual 
functions, which require intuition, insight and reflection. The Indian buddhi is in some ways 
comparable to the Greek noûs, while manas is responsible for lower level discursive thought 
and analysis. But buddhi is still regarded as a manifestation of prakṛti, albeit the most subtle 
and refined form which material substance can assume. The combination of manas and 
buddhi roughly correspond to what is meant by the objective or 'impersonal' mental faculties 
in western philosophical discourse. In addition, Sāṃkhya-Yoga recognizes a third component 
of mind, ahamkāra, which is the ego or phenomenal self. Ahamkāra appropriates all mental 
experiences to itself, and thus 'personalizes' the objective activities of manas and buddhi by 
assuming possession of them. The combination of these three faculties is referred to as 
antahkaraṇa, the 'inner instrument,' which approximately comprises the individual mind-self 
of the western philosophical tradition. 
 
But on the Sāṃkhya-Yoga account, the realm of prakṛti or matter is held to be inherently 
unconscious, and is thereby incapable of producing consciousness as an effect. The 
manifestations of prakṛti are always objects, and it is argued that objects can never transform 
themselves into subjects. Thus at the heart of this dualistic position is the notion that mind-
material is not capable of generating consciousness out of unconscious ingredients. 
Subjective awareness is seen as a distinct ontological category, and in principle it cannot be 
derived from the stuff of which objects are made. So, in sharp contrast to the current orthodox 
western view, Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy holds that the Hard Problem of consciousness 
cannot, in principle, be solved within a physicalist framework. And in sharp contrast with 
Cartesian dualism, the mind and the cognitive activities it sustains are held to be intrinsically 
unconscious, since manas, buddhi and ahamkāra are all manifestations of prakṛti. 
 
According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view, the dynamics of prakṛti are governed by the 
interactions of the three guṇas, which are the three basic types of constituent of physical 
substance. The three guṇas are sattva, rajas and tamas, which correspond roughly with 
'transparency and buoyancy,' 'energy and activity,' and 'inertia and obstruction.' All physical 
phenomena are believed to consist of unstable mixtures of these three types of constituent, 
and the instability of these mixtures is responsible for the evolution and transformations of 
the material world. Thus the conceptual processes sustained by the mind are governed by the 
mechanical and unconscious interplay of the guṇas, and to this extent, mental phenomena are 
viewed in purely 'physicalistic' or mechanical terms. The unfolding of thought-forms is an  
integral part of the evolution of prakṛti, and mental processes are simply the result of 
appropriate transformations of unconscious material substance.  
 
Consciousness, on the other hand, is held to belong to a different ontological category 
altogether. Consciousness is placed in the realm of puruṣa, the absolute, unconditioned self, 
which in some respects is comparable to Kant's noumenal self. Puruṣa is described as pure 
and undifferentiated awareness, and it is held to be immutable and inactive, to be formless 
and without parts or limiting characteristics. Puruṣa is the metaphysical principle underlying 
the individual person, and closely corresponds to the atman of the Vedānta school.3 Puruṣa is 
held to exist in complete independence of the material realm, and so the basic dualism in the 
Sāṃkhya-Yoga metaphysics is between puruṣa and prakṛti, between consciousness and 
matter. On this account, mind belongs to the world of matter, while the self belongs to the 
realm of pure awareness, and thus the mind and the self are ontologically distinct. Movement 
and form are characteristics of matter, and they are also characteristics of thought, which is a 
manifestation of matter, while consciousness is held to be intrinsically formless and 
unchanging. 
 
What then is the relationship between consciousness and matter, and how are conscious 
mental events possible? According to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga model, thought processes and 
mental events are conscious only to the extent that they receive external 'illumination' from 
puruṣa. Consciousness is standardly compared to a light, which illuminates the specific 
material configurations or 'shapes' assumed by the mind. It is the subtle 'thought-material' 
of the buddhi which allows mental events to appear conscious, because the refined buddhi 
substance is transparent to the light of consciousness. Thus conscious thoughts and perceptual 
experiences take place when buddhi receives representational forms, both perceptual and 
conceptual, from manas, the organ of cognition. Buddhi is held to consist of a preponderance 
of the 'transparent' sattva guna, and thus the representational forms it receives from manas 
are capable of becoming translucent with the light of consciousness. So buddhi receives 
cognitive structures from manas, and conscious 'light' from puruṣa, and in this manner, 
specific mental structures are capable of being illuminated by an external source, and thereby 
these structures are able to appear conscious. But consciousness itself is entirely independent 
of the particular thought structures it happens to illuminate.  
 
Consciousness as such is not directed towards these objects, it has no intention to illuminate 
the limited material structures in question, and it is completely independent of the mental 
phenomena upon which its light happens to fall. As such, puruṣa shares some key properties 
in common with the pure consciousness or cit of Vedāntic thought, and in this regard Karl 
Potter's exposition of the latter is relevant:   
 … whereas ordinary awareness not only has an object but also requires it as the 
 occasion for that specific piece of awareness or judgment, pure consciousness has  no  
 more relation to its objects than does the sun that shines on everything without 
 being in the least affected by or dependent on things. (1981, p. 93). 
 The translucent quality of buddhi distinguishes thought-stuff from the gross material objects 
of thought and perception, which ordinarily contain a preponderance of the 'dark' or opaque 
tamas guna. Thus only the thought material of buddhi is capable of conscious illumination, 
rather than the entire material realm, since a preponderance of the tamas guna renders the 
external objects of the material realm opaque to the light of consciousness. Hence 
representational structures, rather than the objects represented, are capable of conscious 
illumination, which is why minds appear sentient while stones and tables do not. Only the 
subtle stuff of the mind is a suitable medium for receiving conscious illumination, and thus it 
is minds which are the loci of awareness in the natural world. But there simply is no res 
cogitans, no conscious thinking substance in Descartes' sense. It is material substance which 
thinks, and it is the self which makes these thoughts conscious. 
 
3. Some Advantages of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga View 
The first point to note in this regard is that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view immediately avoids one 
of the most serious pitfalls of Cartesian dualism, since on the Indian account, mental 
causation does not violate physical conservation laws. By including the mind in the realm of 
matter, mental events are granted causal efficacy, and are therefore able to directly initiate 
bodily motions, including verbal behavior. And, conversely, material structures and forces 
are able to have genuine mental effects, as required by normal accounts of, say, the flow of 
information involved in perceptual awareness of the environment. The representational 
content of sensory experiences can now be treated as straightforward consequences of the 
physical environment's causal impingements upon the sense organs and brain. This is 
because, in contrast to standard Western dualism, there is no longer a causal/ontological gulf 
separating mind from matter. Hence two glaring aspects of the mind-body problem which 
plague Descartes' model are thereby elegantly resolved. 
 
Some further elaboration of the foregoing issue is perhaps in order. On the Cartesian view, 
subjective presentations or 'ideas', as structured objects, are held to belong to the non-material 
realm. But, at the same time, they are held to represent external material objects and states of 
affairs. This leads to an immediate and very serious difficulty, since if the two spheres are 
metaphysically independent, then it is highly unclear how events in the mental realm could be 
related to or systematically represent objects in the material realm. Thought becomes 
separated, by an ontological chasm, from the external objects of thought, and the inner world 
of subjective experience threatens to become a solipsistic bubble. Hence one of the most 
serious defects of the Cartesian framework, the reverse aspect of the problem of mental 
causation, resides in the fact that outside inputs from the environment, such as sound waves 
and electromagnetic radiation, can have no real affect on res cogitans, and the ideas 
entertained by thinking substance are hence ontologically and causally detached from their 
corresponding objects in res extensa.   
 
On the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view, the mind is impacted by various forms of external stimuli, 
which give rise to internal structures that mirror various key aspects of the external world. 
These internal structures are instantiated as modifications of the material manas, which in 
turn represent salient aspects of the environment. This picture possess a significant advantage 
over Cartesian dualism, because, since the mind is material it can receive physical stimuli 
from the outside world, and undergo appropriate internal modifications, without invoking 
troublesome interactions between disparate substances. So, on this model, the 
representational content of thought is carried in the unconscious physical configurations of 
the mind, and certain of these patterns or configurations become illuminated by an external 
and undifferentiated awareness, resulting in the phenomenon of particular conscious thoughts 
and subjective experiences.  
 
Thus, in contrast to Cartesianism, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga framework isolates the problem of 
consciousness at a more exact and focussed level. It is the conscious, subjective aspect of 
visual perception which underlies the Hard Problem and serves to motivate the introduction 
of a distinct metaphysical category, not the causally induced representational structure of 
perception, since it is theoretically feasible that the latter can be explained in terms of 
unconscious mechanisms, of generally the same sort that would be applied in the case of 
robotic 'vision' or even CCTV cameras. The deep philosophical problem in the case of human 
perception lies not in the explication of representational content or structure, but rather in the 
fact that this bio-mechanically induced structure is imbued with conscious awareness. Thus 
Descartes' dualism of mind and matter, wherein conscious presentations qua structured 
objects are placed in the purely non-material realm, embodies an unhappy conflation of 
theoretically distinct features, and it thereby creates a causal abyss which insulates perceptual 
experience from the material objects which are perceived. It is consciousness, rather than 
content, which provides the most compelling impetus for dualism. 
 
Thus the Sāṃkhya-Yoga division is based on a more perspicuous distillation of the salient 
components of subjective experience, where the world of qualia, the 'Cartesian theatre' of 
conscious presentation, is analysed as a mixture rather than as a realm of pure substance. The 
representational content of qualia is due to the respective material structures or patterns 
which comprise them, while conscious illumination is external, and ontologically 
independent of structure. Conscious illumination of structure is made possible by the 
particular composition of the pattern, wherein the transparent material of thought-stuff 
enables the light of puruṣa to enter. Thus representational content is comparable to the 
geometrical patterns of a stained glass window, which exist independently of their 
illumination by the sun. The illuminated patterns are a composite, consisting both of 
structured glass, which is analogous to the thought-shapes assumed by sattvic buddhi, and of 
luminescence, which is the consciousness of puruṣa. In this manner, qualia are seen as 
composite phenomena, and, in the case of perceptual experience, there is no ontological gap 
separating representational objects from the objects represented. Instead, it is the underlying 
conscious illumination, common to all experience, which defines the metaphysical 
boundary line between subject and object. 
 
As a closing point in this section it should be observed that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga approach 
yields a much more streamlined metaphysical picture than the Cartesian model. Western non-
interactive dualism requires a systematic correlation between the physical and mental realms. 
For example, a particular causally efficacious brain state corresponding to, say, my desire to 
raise my right arm, must exist independently in res extensa, and this state is then paralleled in 
res cogitans by the subjective conscious thought that I want to raise my right arm. However, 
the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view induces no such metaphysical duplication. There is the causally 
efficacious material-mind state of wanting to raise my right arm, which is illuminated by the 
undifferentiated light of pure consciousness. Parallel and redundant immaterial mental states, 
mirroring their physical correlates, are no longer needed.   
 
So, in a variety of respects, the ancient Sāṃkhya-Yoga version of substance dualism provides 
a more felicitous dividing line between substances than does the Cartesian parsing of mind 
and matter. Descartes' picture of consciousness and the mind has had a tremendous influence 
on the development of Western thought; to a large extent it still defines the terms in which 
the mind-body problem is conceived, and it colors many contemporary notions of mental 
content, representation and causation. Thus the alternative Sāṃkhya-Yoga view is worthy of 
serious philosophical attention. A far wider range of cognitive phenomena are made available 
to naturalistic explanation, simply because the mind is included in the physical world. But, at 
the same time, the unique and autonomous status of conscious subjectivity is preserved. By 
conceiving the problem along subtlely different lines, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view already solves 
some of the critical difficulties which would haunt a naturalized version of Descartes' model. 
 
4. The Hard Problem of Consciousness 
In opposition to dualism, physicalism maintains that all mental phenomena, including 
propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires, as well as episodes of conscious 
experience, are ultimately physical in nature. Thus all mental phenomena are held to be either 
literally identical to physical processes such as brain states, or else directly 'supervene upon' 
or are 'emergent from' such states. But the Hard Problem of consciousness puts very serious 
pressure on such a view. As discussed at the outset of the paper, physics accounts for the 
universe strictly in terms of objective primary qualities, and hence has no need of (and 
seemingly no theoretical space for) subjective first-person experience. Electro-chemical 
processes in the cerebral cortex, on the one hand, and the qualitative experience of the 
blueness of the sky, on the other, seem utterly distinct. 
 
This has led some 20
th
 century philosophers, such as Kripke (1973), to argue that physicalism 
is false, and that conscious phenomena belong to a separate metaphysical category. 
According to Kripke’s paraphrase, Descartes argued that the mind is distinct from the body, 
since the mind could in principle continue existing without the body. But Kripke quite rightly 
observes that the argument could go in the other direction just as well: mind and body are 
distinct because the body could have existed without the (conscious) mind. Thus he considers 
the possibility of a 'zombie' universe, one that is physically identical to ours, replete with 
materially indistinguishable human bodies and brains, but where there is no conscious 
experience. As mentioned previously, this possibility is consistent with scientific theory and 
all available empirical evidence. So, via a sophisticated modal argument based on the 
principle of necessary identity, Kripke concludes that mind and brain cannot be identical. 
Instead, a la Locke and Leibniz, a merely contingent correlation happens to obtain in the 
actual world.   
 
Other philosophers, such as Nagel (1973) and Levine (1983), hold that, although the Hard 
Problem does not directly entail that physicalism is false, it does show that we do not 
currently have the theoretical resources to understand or explain how it could be true ‒ a 
major advance in our conceptual framework would be required to fully explicate how 
conscious experience can be subsumed by physical theory. Hence Nagel argues that asserting 
that 'mind = brain'  at the current time is like saying 'mass = energy' to someone in ancient 
Greece. The ancient Greek wouldn’t have the beginning of a clue as to how the statement 
might be true, because the ancient Greek would lack the theoretical and mathematical 
resources required to formally interconvert the two. So, although true, 'mass = energy' would 
be just a brute stipulation. And according to Nagel, we’re in the same position right now with 
respect to physicalism.  
 But is the situation not worse than Nagel's analogy suggests? 'Mass = energy' is still a normal 
case of scientific explanation: the terms on either side of the equation both refer to objective 
physical phenomena, to primary qualities. And as Nagel himself claims at the start of his 
paper, such standard cases of scientific understanding and successful reduction seem to shed 
no light on the relation between mind and brain. Here we are trying to equate something 
objective, quantitative and scientifically normal on the one side (brains), with something 
subjective, qualitative,  and empirically quite abnormal on the other (first person conscious 
experience). In this respect, the Hard Problem of consciousness seems historically 
unparalleled. 
 
Jackson (1982) is another philosopher who, like Kripke, utilizes the Hard Problem to argue 
that physicalism is not just theoretically intractable, but literally false. According to his 
celebrated Knowledge Argument, there’s more to reality than mere physical information can 
convey. Accordingly, he contends that physicalism is false because it is incomplete ‒ in 
principle it cannot explain or account for qualia. Instead, Jackson advocates a version of 
Huxley's epiphenomenalism ‒ he argues that qualia are metaphysically real, but causally 
impotent with respect to the physical world. He holds that qualia are a non-physical effect of 
a physical cause, viz. certain brain processes. The brain processes themselves are causally 
efficacious in the physical realm and are highly conducive to our survival, but qualia are a 
causally impotent, non-physical side effect. Qualitative states may seem to cause physical 
events such as bodily movements, but only because both the bodily motion and the conscious 
experience have a common physical cause; namely an underlyng brain process. Thus the 
experienced sequence of events unfolds as if conscious thoughts and desires were playing a 
role, but this perceived unity between conscious mind and physical body is due, not to a 
divine harmony between distinct metaphysical realms, but rather to a shared underlying 
cause.   
 
It is salient to note that, in common with Jackson's dualism, the purely conscious aspect of 
human experience is also rendered epiphenomenal on the Sāṃkhya-Yoga account. The 
representational content of thought is carried in the unconscious physical configurations of 
the mind, and certain of these patterns or configurations become illuminated by the external 
and undifferentiated awareness of puruṣa, resulting in particular conscious thoughts and 
subjective experiences. But consciousness and the  illuminated mental processes are entirely 
independent. Formless and immutable consciousness plays no causal role in the 
transformation of mental structures, but rather is a passive 'witness' to some small portion of 
these transformations. The representations and structural transformations that characterize 
mental contents and processes are part of the normal time-evolution of the physical universe. 
Some of these happen to be illuminated by an outside, non-physical source of consciousness, 
which itself does no work and does not alter the physical realm in any way.  
 
In this regard, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view can accommodate many of the claims of physicalism 
with respect to key aspects of the mind-body problem, such as mental causation and mental 
representation, and it eliminates the unappealing metaphysical redundancy required by both 
Cartesian dualism and Jackson's 'floating world' of immaterial qualia. But in response to the 
Hard Problem, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view adheres to the basic tenet that subjectivity and 
consciousness cannot arise from unconscious ingredients, and hence physicalism is 
intrinsically incapable of solving the problem. Instead, the issue is addressed by postulating 
pure consciousness as a distinct and autonomous substance. 
 
Of course, dualism of any sort is seen by many as an unsatisfactory final solution. In general, 
monism is a more elegant philosophical stance, which is no doubt one of the intellectual 
attractions of physicalism. The main rival to physicalism in this respect is some form of 
monistic idealism, where consciousness rather than matter is taken as the fundamental reality. 
And whereas the Hard Problem constitutes a perhaps fatal impediment for physicalsim, there 
is no analogous reciprocal difficulty for idealism. It is deeply mysterious how conscious 
experience could possibly arise from objective and unconscious physical components, but it 
seems relatively unproblematic that the appearance of material reality might stem from 
consciousness itself. If consciousness is taken as the primary substance, then there isn't a 
parallel obstacle in explaining the empirical evidence upon which the scientific hypotheses 
concerning the physical universe are founded. Hence some version of consciousness-based 
monism, such as that advocated by Advaita Vedānta philosophy, may ultimately provide a 




1. By using the label 'Sāṃkhya-Yoga' philosophy, I do not mean to endorse the view 
that the two schools are essentially the same, nor that Yoga is simply an applied or practical 
component grafted onto Sāṃkhya theory (see, e.g. 'Yoga and Sāṃkhya: The Important 
Differences', Larson, 2008). Instead, I merely wish to discuss some theoretical points which 
the two schools have in common, though I  have tended to use predominantly Sāṃkhya 
terminology.  
 
2. In the ensuing discussion, the terms 'prakṛti' and 'matter' will be used roughly as 
synonyms, even though this is not strictly correct, if matter is construed in terms of the 
'particles' which make up physical objects. Prakṛti is the metaphysical principle which 
underlies physical manifestations, although for expository convenience I will often equate 
the physical world with prakṛti. 
 
3. It should be noted, however, that Sāṃkhya-Yoga recognizes a multiplicity of distinct 
puruṣas, i.e. one for each self, while Vedāntic thought tends to view the atman as 
ultimately singular. Hence on the former account, there is a numerically distinct puruṣa 
associated with each material mind-complex.  
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